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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Joey Hall timely appeals from the district court's order revoking his probation and 
executing his underlying sentence of five years, with two years fixed, for possession of 
methamphetamine. On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred when it failed to 
conduct a sufficient inquiry of Mr. Hall and his trial counsel upon Mr. Hall's request for 
substitute counsel during his probation revocation proceedings. Mr. Hall further asserts 
that the district court erred in failing to appoint substitute counsel based upon the 
grounds he set forth to the court in support of his request. 
In addition, he asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
Mr. Hall's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion seeking a reduction of 
his sentence following the district court's revocation of his probation. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Joey Hall was charged with felony possession of methamphetamine. (R., p.43.) 
Pursuant to an agreement of the parties, Mr. Hall pleaded guilty to this charge, but the 
district court withheld judgment in his case and his case was transferred to drug court. 
(7/3/08 Tr. 1, p.3, L.2 - p.9, L.11; R., pp.79-81, 84-86.) According to the terms of his 
withheld judgment, Mr. Hall was placed on probation for a period of three years. 
(R., p.84.) 
Thereafter, the State filed a motion seeking revocation of Mr. Hall's probation 
based upon the allegation that Mr. Hall had violated the terms and conditions of his 
1 Due to the fact that there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this 
case, and for ease of reference, citations made herein to the transcripts are made in 
accordance with the date of the proceeding transcribed. 
1 
probation by changing his residence without the prior approval of his probation officer, 
failing to appear in drug court when scheduled, admitting to having consumed alcohol 
and controlled substances, failing to follow the requests of his probation officer, and by 
being terminated from the drug court program. (R, pp.112-118, 134.) Mr. Hall admitted 
to the alleged violation that he was terminated from the drug court program, and the 
State dismissed the remaining allegations of probation violations. (1/15/10 Tr., p.5, L.4 
- p.7, L.11; R., pp.146-147.) 
Prior to the disposition hearing, Mr. Hall filed a motion to set aside his admission 
to the probation violation. (R., p.154.) The district court permitted Mr. Hall to withdraw 
his prior admission to the probation violation. (R., p.161.) Thereafter, an evidentiary 
hearing was held on the State's allegations of probation violations. (R., pp.163-164.) 
At this hearing, the State presented evidence from Mr. Hall's supervising officer 
from the drug court program. (7/2/10 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.8, L.14.) This probation officer 
testified as to the basis for the State's allegations of probation violations. (7/2/1 0 
Tr., p.8, L.12 - p.29, L.4.) Mr. Hall also testified on his own behalf. (7/2/10 Tr., p.31, 
L.9 - p.55, L.14.) Although the district court did not find that the State had proven all of 
the allegations of probation violations, the court did find that Mr. Hall had violated the 
terms and conditions of his probation by not reporting as required to his probation 
officer, consuming drugs, and by not following all lawful requests of his probation officer. 
(7/2/10Tr., p.62, L.5-p.64, L.12.) 
Following the district court's findings, but prior to the disposition hearing on these 
probation violations, the State filed another motion and affidavit seeking revocation of 
Mr. Hall's probation. (R., pp.165-166.) In the report of probation violations attached to 
this motion, the State alleged that Mr. Hall had committed new violations of the terms 
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and conditions of his probation by failing to submit to drug testing on two occasions, and 
by being terminated from the drug court program. (R., pp.168-169.) The State asked 
the court to be able to litigate these allegations following its disposition hearing on the 
probation violations already found by the district court. (R., p.176.) 
At the disposition hearing, the State indicated that it would dismiss the 
allegations of probation violations if the district court revoked Mr. Hall's probation and he 
was placed on a rider. (7/16/10 Tr., p.66, Ls.17-21.) Following the disposition hearing, 
the district court revoked Mr. Hall's probation; sentenced him to five years, with two 
years fixed; and retained jurisdiction over his case for 365 days. (7/16/10 Tr., p.73, L.4 
- p.75, L.5; R., pp.179-180.) Prior to the expiration of this period of retained jurisdiction, 
the district court placed Mr. Hall on probation for three years. (12/17/10 Tr., p.4, L.14 -
p.8, L.5; R., pp.184-192.) 
Just over one month later, the State filed another motion and affidavit asking the 
court to revoke Mr. Hall's probation. (R., pp.201-205.) The affidavit attached to this 
motion alleged that Mr. Hall violated his probation by committing the offense of resisting 
or obstructing an officer (although the affidavit noted that this charge was still pending at 
the time), by consuming metharnphetamine and alcohol, and by failing to submit to 
testing for use of controlled substances and alcohol. (R., pp.204-205.) 
At the evidentiary hearing on the State's allegations of probation violations, 
Mr. Hall informed the district court that he wished to have new counsel based upon his 
trial counsel's failure to consult with him, discuss his case, or respond in any manner to 
his requests that trial counsel take certain actions with regard to the proceedings. 
(3/9/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-20.) Mr. Hall had apparently also asked to review some of the 
State's evidence regarding the allegations of probation violations and had not been 
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provided that evidence by his counsel. (3/9/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.18-23.) According to 
Mr. Hall, he had met with his trial counsel once in connection with a separate 
misdemeanor case, but that his counsel had not otherwise met with him at all in 
connection with the probation revocation proceedings. (3/9/11 Tr., p.5, L.24 - p.6, 
L.18.) 
The district court's response was first to tell Mr. Hall that he could hire private 
counsel in his probation case. (3/9/11 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.2.) The court also stated 
that it had prior knowledge of how trial counsel "conducts her cases," and indicated the 
court's belief that trial counsel was "very competent." (3/9/11 Tr., p. 7, Ls.4-9.) In light of 
the court's general opinion of trial counsel's past performance, the court denied 
Mr. Hall's motion for conflict counsel and proceeded to hold the evidentiary hearing on 
theState'sallegationsofprobationviolations. (3/9/11 Tr., p.7, L.9-p.10, L.10.) 
Thereafter, the State presented the testimony of Mr. Hall's probation officer. 
(3/9/11 Tr., p.10, L.19 - p.11, L.9.) According to her testimony, Mr. Hall had admitted to 
consuming both alcohol and methamphetamine while on probation. (3/9/11 Tr., p.11, 
Ls.19-25.) She further testified that Mr. Hall had to refused to submit to urine tests as 
required under his probation agreement and had been charged with the criminal offense 
of resisting and obstructing a police officer. (3/9/11 Tr., p.12, Ls.1-24.) However, 
Mr. Hall's probation officer admitted on cross-examination that her testimony was based 
upon what she had been told by third parties regarding Mr. Hall's conduct while on 
probation, and was not based upon her own personal knowledge. (3/9/11 Tr., p.14, L.3 
-p.17, L.19.) 
The State also presented the testimony from the probation officer to whom 
Mr. Hall allegedly made the admissions of having consumed alcohol and 
4 
methamphetamine. (3/9/11 Tr., p.22, L.11 - p.24, L.7.) However, this officer testified 
that Mr. Hall did not sign any written admissions of this alleged conduct. (3/9/11 
Tr., p.24, Ls.9-13.) Mr. Hall also refused to do a urine test for drugs or alcohol as 
required under the terms and conditions of his probation, according to this officer. 
(3/9/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.14-22.) 
Following the presentation of evidence, the district court found that the State had 
not presented sufficient evidence that Mr. Hall had committed the offense of resisting or 
obstructing a police officer. (3/9/11 Tr., p.47, Ls.11-16.) But the district court did find 
that the State had established that Mr. Hall had violated the terms and conditions of his 
probation by consuming alcohol and refusing to submit to testing of his urine at his 
probation officer's request. (3/9/11 Tr., p.47, Ls.17-25.) The district court also found 
that Mr. Hall had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, as alleged in the 
addendum to the report of probation violations, by failing to follow the directives of his 
probation officer and by having contact with an individual that he was specifically 
ordered not to contact. (3/21/11 Tr., p.5, L.4 - p.7, L.20.) The court thereafter revoked 
Mr. Hall's probation and executed his original sentence of five years, with two years 
fixed. (3/21/11 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-22; R., pp.247-248.) Mr. Hall then filed a Rule 35 
motion seeking a reduction of his sentence. (R., pp.249-250.) The State objected to 
this motion, and the motion was subsequently denied by the district court. (R., pp.252, 
273-275.) However, the court partially granted Mr. Hall's motion for credit for time 
served. (R., pp.277-294.) 
Mr. Hall timely appeals from the district court's order revoking his probation and 
executing his underlying sentence of five years, with two years fixed. (R., p.256.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when the court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry of 
Mr. Hall and his trial counsel upon Mr. Hall's request for appointment of 
substitute counsel for his probation revocation proceedings, and in failing to 
appoint substitute counsel for Mr. Hall? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when the court denied Mr. Hall's Rule 35 
motion seeking lenience in sentencing following the revocation of Mr. Hall's 
probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When The Court Failed To Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry Of 
Mr. Hall And His Trial Counsel Upon Mr. Hall's Request For Appointment Of Substitute 
Counsel For His Probation Revocation Proceedings And When The Court Failed To 
Appoint Substitute Counsel For Mr. Hall 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hall submits that the trial court erred when the court failed to conduct a full 
and fair hearing, as required by law, upon his request for substitute counsel in his 
probation revocation proceedings. Because of this, he asks that this Court remand his 
case to the district court for a determination of whether good cause exists for the 
appointment of substitute counsel and for any further proceedings that may be 
necessary as a result of the trial court's determination. 
Additionally, if this Court finds that the district court made sufficient inquiry into 
Mr. Hall's request for substitute counsel, Mr. Hall asserts that he demonstrated good 
cause for the appointment of substitute counsel pursuant to I.C. § 19-856. Accordingly, 
the district court abused its discretion when it denied his request. 
B. The District Court Erred When The Court Failed To Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry 
Of Mr. Hall And His Trial Counsel Upon Mr. Hall's Request For Appointment Of 
Substitute Counsel For His Probation Revocation Proceedings 
At the evidentiary hearing on the State's allegations of probation violations, 
Mr. Hall made a request of the district court to appoint substitute counsel on his behalf. 
(3/9/11 Tr., p.5, L.7 - p.7, L.24.) During this hearing, Mr. Hall attempted to make the 
district court aware of the breakdown in communications between himself and his trial 
attorney. (3/9/11 Tr., p.5, PL.7 - p.7, L.24.) However, rather than asking trial counsel 
regarding Mr. Hall's concerns, including the fact that trial counsel had not even met with 
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Mr. Hall regarding his probation revocation proceedings prior to this evidentiary hearing, 
the district court instead merely told Mr. Hall that he could try to pay for his own attorney 
if he did not like appointed counsel, and then asserted the court's belief in the 
competence of Mr. Hall's counsel based upon the trial court's past experience with this 
attorney in other cases. (3/9/11 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.17.) Mr. Hall asserts that the 
district court, in so doing, failed to conduct the full and fair hearing required by law upon 
his request for substitute counsel, and that a remand of his case is therefore appropriate 
so that the trial court may properly determine whether there exists good cause for the 
appointment of substitute counsel. 
Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, 
Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution, guarantee the right to counsel for criminal 
defendants. See, e.g., State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 594 (Ct. App. 2007). The right 
of an indigent defendant to counsel encompasses the right to effective assistance of 
counsel. State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897 (1980). 
However, the right to counsel does not necessarily encompass the right to 
counsel of one's own choosing. Lippert, 145 Idaho at 594. "Mere lack of confidence in 
otherwise competent counsel is not necessarily grounds for substitute counsel in 
absence of extraordinary circumstances." Id. While this is the case, by statute in Idaho, 
a trial court has discretion to appoint substitute counsel for good cause. See I.C. § 19-
856; Clayton, 100 Idaho at 897. This Court reviews the district court's determination as 
to whether to appoint substitute counsel for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nath, 137 
Idaho 712, 714-715 (2002). 
Where a defendant requests substitute counsel, the district court is under no 
obligation to affirmatively act as an advocate for the defendant in determining whether 
8 
to appoint substitute counsel. Clayton, 100 Idaho at 898. But the court nevertheless 
must afford the defendant a full and fair hearing on the request for substitute counsel. 
Id. 
This is the case even where the trial court maintains some initial skepticism as to 
the basis for the defendant's request. As was noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
State v. Peck, '"even well-founded suspicions of intentional delay and manipulative 
tactics can provide no substitute for the inquiries necessary to protect a defendant's 
constitutional rights."' State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 714 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting 
U.S. v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
The Idaho Supreme Court case of Nath is particularly instructive for this Court, 
given the nature of the district court's response to Mr. Hall's request for substitute 
counsel in this case. In Nath, the Court held that the trial court failed to conduct the 
mandated inquiry upon the defendant's request for substitute counsel. Nath, 137 Idaho 
at 714-715. The defendant in Nath requested substitute counsel due to the fact that trial 
counsel had failed to investigate certain potential witnesses and failed to obtain the 
documents requested by the defendant. Id. In response, the district court did not 
review the totality of the defendant's claims and merely characterized the defendant's 
dissatisfactions with counsel as a complaint that his trial counsel was not following the 
defendant's requests and instructions. Id. Because the trial court did not provide the 
defendant an adequate opportunity to explain his reasons for seeking substitute 
counsel, and because the trial court's "review of this motion did not encompass the 
totality of [the defendant's] claims," the Court in Nath held that the trial court failed to 
provide the defendant with the required full and fair hearing on his request. Id. 
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In this case, Mr. Hall arguably presented a much stronger claim for substitution of 
his appointed counsel. Like the defendant in Nath, Mr. Hall identified to the court 
evidence in relation to his probation revocation proceedings that he had asked defense 
counsel to procure, but that was never collected. (3/9/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-23.) But Mr. Hall 
identified a far more serious issue with his appointed counsel. Namely, that counsel 
had never met with Mr. Hall at all in connection with his probation revocation 
proceedings and refused to answer his attempts at communicating with her.2 (Tr., p.5, 
L.24 - p.6, L.21.) 
The district court, in response, did not ask any questions of trial counsel to verify 
whether Mr. Hall was correct in stating that counsel had never met with him prior to the 
evidentiary hearing regarding his probation revocation proceedings, or whether counsel 
had, in fact, been refusing to communicate with Mr. Hall. (3/9/11 Tr., p.5, L.7 - p.7, 
L.23.) After Mr. Hall informed the court that he had not talked to appointed counsel at 
all concerning his case, the district court merely disregarded Mr. Hall's allegations by 
telling him that he could always hire a private lawyer if he so wished and that, "that's 
kind of the way this works." (3/9/11 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.5.) In doing so, the court 
failed to recognize its obligation to provide a meaningful hearing into Mr. Hall's claims 
for substitution of counsel, including whether Mr. Hall's counsel had actually refused to 
consult with Mr. Hall at all regarding his probation revocation proceedings. Because the 
district court failed to adequately determine whether Mr. Hall was being deprived of his 
right to the meaningful assistance of counsel, but instead dismissed Mr. Hall's concerns 
2 Mr. Hall apparently met with his appointed counsel once at a hearing with regard to a 
separate misdemeanor charge for which counsel was also representing Mr. Hall. 
(3/9/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.6-18.) 
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as being merely endemic to the system of indigent defense, the court failed to conduct 
the inquiry necessary to address Mr. Hall's request for appointment of counsel. 
Where the trial court fails to conduct the legally mandated inquiry upon a request 
for substitute counsel, the appropriate remedy is to remand the case back to the trial 
court for a hearing to determine whether good cause has been shown for the 
appointment of substitute counsel pursuant to I.C. § 19-856. Lipperl, 145 Idaho at 596. 
If the trial court determines that good cause has been shown for the appointment of 
substitute counsel, then a new trial or new proceedings must be held following the 
appointment of substitute counsel. Id. at 597. Accordingly, Mr. Hall asks that this Court 
remand his case back to the district court for a proper determination of whether 
substitute counsel should be appointed in his probation revocation proceedings. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Appoint Substitute Counsel For 
Mr. Hall Pursuant To LC.§ 19-856 
In addition, even if the district court had provided Mr. Hall an adequate hearing 
into his request for substitute counsel, Mr. Hall asserts that the denial of his request for 
appointment of substitute counsel under I.C. § 19-856 was an abuse of discretion.3 
As previously noted, it is a matter of the trial court's discretion whether to grant a 
request for substitute counsel pursuant to LC. § 19-856. Nath, 137 Idaho at 714-715. 
3 Although Mr. Hall is challenging the district court's failure to conduct an adequate 
inquiry as to Mr. Hall's request for substitute counsel in his probation revocation 
proceedings and failure to appoint substitute counsel, he is not raising a direct claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel at this time and would reserve the right to bring any 
such claims through a petition seeking post-conviction relief. See Lipperl, 145 Idaho at 
597 n.4 ("We note that Lippert will not be precluded from bringing an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim in a post-conviction proceeding because ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a separate issue from whether he was entitled to substitute 
counsel.") 
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This Court reviews a discretionary determination of the trial court for whether the court: 
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one within the trial court's discretion, (2) acted within 
the boundaries of that discretion and consistently with the legal standards attendant to 
the choices available to the court; and (3) reached its decision through the exercise of 
reason. See, e.g., Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 627 (2010). Mr. Hall asserts that 
the district court's denial of his motion for substitute counsel was an abuse of discretion 
because the basis for court's determination was not consistent with the legal standards 
applicable to Mr. Hall's request, and because the court did not reach this determination 
through an exercise of reason. 
Idaho Code § 19-856 provides, in pertinent part, that: 
At any stage, including an appeal or other post-conviction proceeding, the 
court concerned may for good cause assign a substitute attorney. The 
substitute attorney has the same functions with respect to the needy 
person as the attorney for whom he is substituted. 
I.C. § 19-856 (emphasis added). 
By the plain terms of this statute, the court's discretion to appoint substitute 
counsel would extend to probation revocation proceedings such as those involved in 
this appeal. The standard set forth by statute for the appointment of substitute counsel 
is whether there is "good cause" to appoint a substitute attorney. I.C. § 19-856. "Good 
cause includes an actual conflict of interest, irrevocable breakdown of 
communication, or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust 
verdict." Lippert, 145 Idaho at 596-597 (emphasis added). In making this 
determination: 
[T]he court must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to 
determine the nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of 
the facts necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship with 
his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound 
discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that his or her 
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Sixth Amendment right would be violated but for substitution. Even when 
the trial judge suspects that the defendant's requests are disingenuous 
and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and to delay the 
trial, perfunctory questioning is not sufficient. 
Id. at 596 (quoting State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). 
In addition, a trial court abuses its discretion in denying the request for substitute 
counsel where the denial of the motion results in a violation of the defendant's right to 
adequate representation of counsel. Nath, 137 Idaho at 715. Therefore, where the 
defendant establishes that appointed counsel is not fulfilling the constitutional 
obligations of counsel to which the defendant is entitled, it is an abuse of discretion to 
deny a request for substitute counsel under I.C. § 19-856. 
In the seminal case of Strickland v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the constitutional guarantee of the effective representation of counsel includes the 
duty to, "consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant 
informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). While a defendant's consent to every tactical 
decision in a case is not required under the Sixth Amendment, "[a]n attorney 
undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the client regarding 'important decisions,' 
including questions of overarching defense strategy." Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 
186 (2004). 
Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Hall's appointed counsel had not met with him in 
connection with the underlying probation revocation proceedings and was refusing 
Mr. Hall's attempts at communications. (3/9/11 Tr., p.5, L.9 - p.6, L.21.) Rather than 
recognizing this complete lack of any consultation or communication as impacting 
Mr. Hall's constitutionally guaranteed right to the effective assistance of counsel, the 
district court merely dismissed his claims on three bases - each of which was in error. 
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First, the court held that Mr. Hall's recourse for his counsel's failure to consult 
with him at all in his case was to hire private counsel, despite the fact that he had been 
appointed counsel in this case due to his financial inability to hire private counsel and 
despite Mr. Hall's statements that he could not afford private counsel while incarcerated. 
(See 3/9/11 Tr., p. 7, Ls.18-22; R., pp.40, 78, 127, 234, 262-266.) However, an indigent 
defendant has the right to court-appointed counsel, and this right includes the right to 
the effective assistance of appointed counsel. See, e.g., Clayton, 100 Idaho at 897. 
Because the district court's dismissal of Mr. Hall's concerns on the basis that he had the 
option of paying for private counsel, when the record shows he could not afford to do 
so, was inconsistent with the legal standards attendant on the court's determination, this 
was an abuse of discretion. 
Second, the court held that the complete failure of appointed counsel to consult 
with Mr. Hall regarding the probation revocation proceedings was, "just kind of the way 
this works." (3/9/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.4-5.) This aspect of the court's determination is 
inconsistent with the legal standards attendant on the district court's discretion. The 
existence of systematic failures of appointed counsel to consult with his or her clients 
does not excuse the obligations of counsel imposed by the constitutions of the United 
States and the State of Idaho. If anything, the existence of such prevalent deprivations 
of this right, as were noted by the district court, require heightened vigilance in order to 
seek to vindicate the constitutional rights of indigent defendants in criminal proceedings. 
But, at the very least, the trial court's invocation of customary practice in the failure of 
appointed counsel to consult with their clients, relied upon as a basis to deny substitute 
counsel to Mr. Hall, was inconsistent with the constitutional and statutory standards 
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governing the court's discretion in this case; and further represents the failure of the trial 
court to exercise its discretion through the exercise of reason. 
Finally, the trial court relied upon its own assessment of trial counsel's 
performance on behalf of other clients in other cases to disregard Mr. Hall's request for 
appointment of substitute counsel based upon counsel's alleged lack of any 
consultation or communications in his case. (Tr., p.7, Ls.5-10.) However, a defendant 
has a personal right to the effective assistance of counsel, whether privately retained or 
appointed by the court. Nath, 137 Idaho at 715. Undoubtedly, Mr. Hall's counsel may 
very well have provided excellent representation for other clients with regard to those 
other criminal proceedings. However, this is not the germane consideration for the 
district court in this case. The court was required to consider the representation that 
Mr. Hall was provided in connection with his own probation revocation proceedings. 
Because the district court's consideration of counsel's performance in other cases was 
not the proper legal standard, the court's denial of Mr. Hall's request for substitute 
counsel on this basis was likewise error. 
Based upon the representations made by Mr. Hall to the trial court, he 
established good cause for the appointment of substitute counsel pursuant to I. C. § 19-
856, and the district court abused its discretion in denying this request. Accordingly, he 
asks that this Court vacate the district court's order revoking his probation and 
executing his sentence, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
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11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When The Court Denied Mr. Hall's Rule 35 
Motion Seeking Lenience In Sentencing Following The Revocation Of Mr. Hall's 
Probation 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hall asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
Rule 35 motion seeking leniency at sentencing following the revocation of his probation. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When The Court Denied Mr. Hall's Rule 
35 Motion Seeking Lenience In Sentencing Following The Revocation Of 
Mr. Hall's Probation 
When a trial court revokes probation, a defendant may file a motion seeking a 
reduction of his or her sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35. See I.C.R. 35; State v. Hoskins, 
131 Idaho 670, 672 (Ct. App. 1998). "A motion for a sentence reduction under this rule 
is essentially a request for leniency which is addressed to the sound discretion of the 
sentencing court." Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 672. The standard of review upon the trial 
court's denial of a Rule 35 motion seeking leniency at sentencing, following the 
revocation of probation, are as follows: 
A motion under this rule is a plea for leniency, addressed to the discretion 
of the trial court. On an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion, the 
appellant bears the burden of showing that the original sentence was 
unduly severe or that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information presented with the motion. An abuse of the trial 
court's discretion will be found only if, in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. The 
reasonableness of the term of confinement is measured against the 
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
retribution. Where reasonable minds might differ as to the 
appropriateness of the term of imprisonment, we will not substitute our 
view for that of the district court. 
State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 533 (Ct. App. 2001). 
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In examining the denial of a Rule 35 motion filed following the revocation of 
probation, this Court's review of the record is plenary. That is, this Court examines, "the 
entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our 
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events 
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." State v. 
Hannington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009). 
As an initial matter, Mr. Hall provided the district court with new and additional 
information in support of his Rule 35 motion. In conjunction with this motion, Mr. Hall 
expressed his willingness to submit to additional supervision and oversight of his 
activities through GPS monitoring if placed back on probation, and presented this 
alternate possible disposition to the district court. (R., pp.249-250.) This information 
was significant in that it demonstrated Mr. Hall's willingness to subject himself to an 
intense degree of supervision in conjunction with his potential placement on probation, 
and further evinces his commitment to abide by the terms of probation under this 
oversight. 
Additionally, a review of the entire record in this case demonstrates that the 
district court abused its discretion in failing to grant Mr. Hall's motion seeking a 
reduction of his sentence in light of his overall rehabilitative potential. Although Mr. Hall 
does have a significant criminal history, a review of his prior criminal history reveals that 
the vast majority of these prior offenses were traffic offenses or were related to his 
underlying substance abuse issues. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, 
PSI), pp.4-11.) Mr. Hall's own struggles with sobriety are perhaps unsurprising, given 
that his own mother struggled with alcoholism for much of Mr. Hall's life. (PSI, p.12.) 
He began drinking and using illegal drugs himself when only a very young teenager. 
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(PSI, p.16.) But, given appropriate treatment and resources to assist Mr. Hall in 
maintaining his sobriety, there is every chance that Mr. Hall can turn a corner and 
successfully change his past patterns of behavior. 
Mr. Hall has already demonstrated that he has the capacity for positive self-
change while serving his period of retained jurisdiction in this case. During this time, 
Mr. Hall successfully completed or was near completion of all the programs in which he 
was placed. (Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI), 
p.1.) He also voluntarily participated in a faith-based recovery program modeled after 
Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonymous. (APSI, p.3.) In conjunction with his efforts 
directed at maintaining his sobriety, Mr. Hall also worked on assignments designed to 
address his underlying emotional issues as well. (APSI, p.3.) According to a reporting 
officer, Mr. Hall continued to make efforts at his rehabilitation that were in addition to 
those required in normal programming, and that his efforts "should prove to be 
beneficial" both in terms of his time on the retained jurisdiction program and after 
leaving the facility. (APSI, p.3.) In light of this, it was recommended that Mr. Hall be 
placed on probation following his period of retained jurisdiction. (APSI, p.5.) 
A review of the entire record in this case, along with Mr. Hall's expressed 
willingness to be subjected to heightened supervision, demonstrates that the district 
court abused its discretion when the court denied Mr. Hall's motion seeking leniency at 
sentencing following the revocation of his probation. Accordingly, Mr. Hall asks that this 
Court vacate the district court's order denying his Rule 35 motion, and remand this case 
for further proceedings. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the fact that the district court failed to adequately inquire into Mr. Hall's 
request for the appointment of substitute counsel, he respectfully requests that this 
Court remand his case to the district court in order to conduct a full and fair hearing 
regarding whether there was good cause to appoint substitute counsel for Mr. Hall. 
Alternatively, if this Court finds that the district court erred in failing to appoint substitute 
counsel based upon the information already before the court, Mr. Hall asks that this 
Court vacate the district court's order revoking his probation and executing his original 
sentence, and remand his case for further proceedings. In the alternative, Mr. Hall asks 
that this Court vacate the district court's order denying his Rule 35 motion and remand 
his case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 2ih day of March, 2012. 
SAR TOMPKIN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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